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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BARTLETT ELECTRIC, INC., 
a Utah Corpora ti on, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
R. DERRELL BALLARD, d/b/a 
BALLARD CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, et al., 
Def end ants and 
Counterclaimants, 
R. DERRELL BALLARD, d/b/a 
BALLARD CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, et al., 
vs. 
Cross Claimant, 
Respondent and 
Cross Appellant, 
REED M. SMITH, et al., 
Cross Def end ants, 
C ounterclaimants, 
Appellants and 
Cross Respondents. 
Case No. 
11302 
RESPONDENTS' AND CROSS APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a mechanic's lien suit by a contractor against 
the owner for the balance due on a construction contract. 
The owner counter-claimed for alleged damages. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court awarded the contractor a judgment 
in the amount of $6,316.95 which reflected offsets allowed 
the owner in the amount of $699 .91. The trial court 
denied the contractor a mechanic's lien and attorney's 
fees. The owner's claim for damages in the cumulative 
amount of $23,363.07 was denied except as to the offset 
of $699.91. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent - Cross Appellant (the contractor) seeks 
affirmance of the judgment rendered below except as to 
the denial of a mechanic's lien and the denial of attorney's 
fees, as to which two times, the respondent seeks a partial 
reversal of the judgment with instruction to grant a me-
chanics' lien and attorney's fees. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellants' statement is contravened generally in that 
it does not present a fair resume' of the evidence adduced 
at the trial - which would have been helpful to the 
Court in determining whether there is any substantial 
evidence to support the judgment. On the contrary, it 
presents none of the evidence favorable to the judgment 
but only carefully extracted excerpts favorable to the ap-
pellants. Failure to present any of the evidence favorable 
to the respondents makes that which is presented of ques-
tionable value. Douglas v. Duvall~ 5 Utah 2d 429, 304 
P. 2d 373 ( 1956). Since respondents cannot concur in ap-
pellants' statement of the facts, the following statement 
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of facts supported by the record is presented to serve as 
a setting for the issues in the case. 
By a lease agreement apparently executed in Novem-
ber, 1961, Reed M. Smith and his wife (the appellants 
herein and hereinafter called the "owner") agreed to 
construct and to lease to D. C. Stephens and his wife and 
David C. Stephens and his wife (hereinafter called either 
the "lessees" or by individual name) a building designed 
as a laundry and dry cleaning center at 2095 East 13 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah (except for a room about 
1712 feet by 33 feet at the north end of the building which 
was not covered by the lease) . (Exhibit 6) 
Later, by a contract dated January 4, 1962, R. Der-
rell Ballard (hereinafter called the "contractor") agreed 
to construct a laundry and dry cleaning building, the 
design, plans and specifications for which has been pre-
pared by Bruce J. McDermott, a Salt Lake City architect. 
(Exhibit 1) The contract is on the A.I.A. Short Form 
for Small Construction Contracts. It specifically provides 
that work is to commence 90 days after receipt of notice 
to commence work. 
Under the contract, the east wall of the building 
was to be spaced one full foot distant from a high retain-
ing wall on the adjoining property immediately to the 
east. (Exhibit 3) 
Some delay was encountered in getting a building-
permit. ( R. 26 7, line 1 ; R. 268, line 12) . Severe freezing 
and inclement weather set in early in January. (R. 270, 
line 26; R. 514, line 3; R. 525, line 19; Ex. 33 p. 3; Ex. 
34 p. 26) By a letter of January 10, addressed to Mc-
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Dermott, receipt of which was admitted by the owner 
( R. 104) the contractor asked for an extension of time 
because of the weather and zoning problems. According 
to the architect's supervisor on the job, Ernest Daniels, 
this extension was granted. (R. 521, line 17; R. 524, line 
24) No contradictory evidence was introduced by the 
owner. 
Immediately upon the first break in the weather 
in early February, the contractor commenced construction 
on the building. (R. 268, line 21) Things went along 
according to the contract until after the footings were in 
and the forms were prepared for the foundation in ac-
cordance with the contract specification that the east 
wall have a foot of space between it and the adjacent 
high retaining wall on the property next door. (Ex. 3) 
At this juncture, in the contractor's absence, the 
owner or the architect acting for him, orally interfered 
with the workmen on the job, requiring them to shift the 
building so that there would be only six inches between 
the building and the right retaining wall instead of the 
one full foot provided by the contract. (R. 345, line 15; 
R. 306, line 19; R. 358, line 12; R. 320) (Ex. 1) 
Under the contract plans, the electrical service hook-
up was to underground to a utility pole which the plans 
showed to be on or within a foot or two of the north 
property line. ( R. 244, line 22) In reality the pole was 
from 10 to 12 feet over into the neighbor's property (R. 
23; R. 244, line 25) Though requested to obtain an 
easement for the underground line, as the contract re-
quired him to do, the owner did not obtain such an ease-
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ment. (Smiths' Deposition, p. 19) As a matter of nec-
essity an overhead service, satisfactory to the architect 
and the electrical engineer was installed. ( R. 246, lines 
15, 28) 
On or about April 20, 1962, the lessees commenced 
installation of their fixtures in the building. (R. 262, line 
14; R. 544, line 4) 
The contract called for the north room of the build-
ing to be only "roughed-in." It was not initially under 
lease to the Stephens nor to anyone else. According to 
the owner, the contractor completed certain work called 
for under the contract - specifically, at least, the tile 
floor and he painting in this room - in late August or 
early September, 1962. (R. 399, line 25; R. 493) 
There is evidence to the effect that the owner's un-
authorized move of the building to just one half of the 
distance specified in the contract between the east wall 
and the adjoining high retaining wall necessitated pour-
ing the east foundation solid against the retaining wall. 
( R. 280; R. 281, line 20) As a consequence, difficulty 
was encountered in keeping water from seeping into the 
building in the area along the joint line between the 
foundation and the block wall on the east side of the 
building. Several attempts were made by the contractor 
to correct this problem. The owner also made attempts 
to reduce the seepage although at one time he unfortu-
nately used hot tar which flowed into the building rather 
than setting in place. The cumulative effect of these efforts 
was substantially, and there is evidence, to completely 
eliminate the water seepage. One of the lessees testified 
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that it was not coming through any more: "All I know 
is that it is not coming in any more." ( R. 548, line 1 ) 
There was no evidence introduced which would indicate 
that water is presently a problem. 
The contractor testified that it was impossible to get 
cooperation out of the owner with reference to matters 
involved in the building, including but not limited to the 
electrical service and the east wall. ( R. 46; R. 4 7 ) 
At one time the contractor sent a letter of intention 
to terminate, but the record is clear, including the own-
er's own admissions that the contractor did not, in fact, 
carry out the suggested termination. (R. 399, line 25; R. 
493) 
Eventually the contractor filed notice of a mechanic's 
lien and brought suit for the balance due under the con-
tract, $5,449.00 plus interest, for a lien and for attorney's 
fees. 
The owner counterclaimed claiming alleged damages 
in the aggregate of $23,363.07. 
At the trial conflicting evidence was introduced con-
cerning all the major items and issues in controversy and 
most of the minor ones. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE CONTRACTOR IS ENTITLED TO 
A MECHANICS' LIEN, A DECREE OF FORE-
CLOSURE THEREOF AND TO ATTORNEY'S 
FEES. 
On October 18, 1962, the contractor recorded a 
notice of a mechanic's lien. 
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Of the many fact issues in the case, one that is really 
not subject to controversy is the question of whether the 
contractor performed work under the contract within he 
statutory limit of 80 days prior to the date of filing of 
his notime of lien. Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 ( 1953) . 
Reed M. Smith, the owner, testified unequivocably 
that the contractor performed work under the contract 
"in the latter part of August or the first part of Septem-
ber," in the following colloquy: 
THE COURT: At any rate, for the cost of a vinyl 
floor you could have rented it to this man for $150 a 
month? 
THE WITNESS: Except at that time Mr. Ballard 
was still doing work on the job. 
THE COURT: All right. Isn't that part of the 
building? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 
BY MR. SCHMID: 
Q. What was he doing? He was putting vinyl floor 
down, wasn't he, painting it? 
A. He did, as I said before, in the latter part of Au-
gust or the first part of September. ( R. 493) 
The contractor's testimony corroborates that the 
notice of lien was field within the statutory time limit. 
(R. 274) 
The dates within which the qualifying work must 
have been done are the 30th of July to the 18th of Octo-
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ber. Clearly work done in August and September meets 
that requirement. 
One can only surmize that the denial of the mechan-
ic's lien, foreclosure and attorney's fees resulted from some 
concept of "fireside" equity. However, the statute is clear 
and the lien should have been granted with the incidents 
of foreclosure and attorney's fees which are the means 
of enforcing the legislatively enunciated policy of protec-
tion for the contractor in situations such as this. 
Accordingly, the trial court's judgment must be re-
versed as to this aspect and remanded with instructions 
to grant a mechanic's lien, decree of foreclosure on it, 
and to award reasonable attorney's fees. 
POINT II. ALL OTHER ASPECTS OF THE JUDG-
MENT MUST BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE THEY 
ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL, COM-
PETENT EVIDENCE. 
The owner's arguments that the judgment must be 
reversed - including arguments about the east wall, al-
leged loss of rent and the listing of items on pages 21 
and 22 of the appellants' brief - all fall into the same 
category. The only issue involved is whether there is any 
substantial, competent evidence, considering also all in-
ferences properly deducible therefrom, taken in the light 
most favorable to the judgment to support the judgment. 
Culley v. Culley, 17 Utah 2d 62, 404 P. 2d 657 ( 1965); 
Christensen v. Christensen, 9 Utah 2d 102, 339 P. 2d 101 
( 1959). 
The order of discussion herein will be the individual 
items which is appears the owner is complaining about in 
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his brief, itemized on pages 21 and 22 of his brief. Then 
will follow a discussion and reference to the evidence 
supporting the trial court's judgment as to the alleged 
damages for the east wall and the alleged damages for 
loss of rent. 
Owner's item No. 1. This concerns the east wall 
and will be discussed later. 
Owner's item No. 2. Asphalt work in parking area. 
The evidence is in conflict. Howard Kent, employee of 
the lessee, testified to a minimal amount of asphalt diffi-
culty - breakage equivalent only to about two large table 
tops (referring to counsel tables in the court room). (R. 
258, line 1) Eugene Bowers, engineer, manager of Bowers 
Construction Company, testified that from his observa-
tions the patches covered about 100 to 150 square feet and 
should have cost about 25 cents to 35 cents per square foot 
if ready for asphalt and an additional ten cents per square 
foot if not. (R. 572, line 14; R. 580, line 11) He esti-
mated a price of about $25.00 ( R. 5 72, line 19) His 
prices were based on the assumption a crew was available 
in the area. (R. 583, line 14) He testified that from his 
experience, cracking was not abnormal in asphalted areas. 
( R. 582, line 1) 
According to D. C. Stephens, one of the lessees, the 
contractor had been persuaded to have the asphalt in-
stalled under wet conditions much against his better judg-
ment. (R. 260, line 13) The owner testified that he had 
had a strip 6 feet wide at the west end of the parking lot 
asphalted, contending that the contractor was obligated 
to do this under his contract ( R. 454, line 9; R. 466, line 
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15) even though the evidence is otherwise indisputable 
that the architect directed that asphalt not be insalled on 
this strip. (R. 278, line 18) (Ex. 17) The owner further 
admitted that at about the same time as he allegedly had 
patching done on the parking lot under construction, he 
also had asphalt work done on another parking lot of his 
just across the street. (R. 461, line 16) He was directed 
by the court to produce payment records for this contem-
poraneous asphalt work across the street. ( R. 461, line 28) 
They were not produced. 
Since there was ample evidence to support a finding 
that the contractor was not liable for even the amount 
allowed the owner, the owner is in no position to complain. 
Owner's item No. 4. Breaking concrete - light stand-
ard. Although the owner testified to the payment and the 
laborer testified to doing the work, there is nothing in 
the record in any manner to show that this was work 
which should have been done by the contractor, or if so 
that he failed correctly to do it. To have awarded damag-
es on the evidence adduced would have been error. 
Owner's item No. 5. Welding and resetting light 
standard. The owner's own witness tetified that the pole 
had been hit by a truck making it out of true, requiring 
repair (R. 442, line 9) but without any indication in the 
record as to who hit it or when. To have allowed this 
item would have been error. 
Owner's item No. 7. Hauling broken concrete. The 
record is devoid of any intimation that this is work which 
the contractor should have done. To have allowed it would 
have been error. 
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Owner's item No. 9. Installing header box, moving 
downspout. Although the owner testified to payment for 
this alleged claim, the record is devoid of any evidence 
to indicate that this was the contractor's obligation. (\\re 
agreed however that $25.00 could be allowed) (R. 161) 
(See item 12 below.) 
Owner's item No. 10. Material and labor to fill in 
lower ventilator openings. Like other assertions of the 
owner, this is not only not borne out by the evidence but 
it contradicted by the testimony of his own agents. Ernest 
C. Daniels, draftsman-architect who supervised construc-
tion on behalf of the owner, testified that the ventilators 
were properly installed by the contractor, but that later 
they were moved because of gas fume seepage from the 
service station on the adjoining property. (R. 520, lines 
15, 17; R. 519, line 23) 
Owner's item No. 12. Labor, Richard E. Long, paint-
ing sand trap cover, digging hole, cleanup. The record is 
devoid of any evidence that these items were obligations 
of the contractor. As to the light standard, the owner's 
witness, Reynolds, testified that a truck had backed into 
the light standard. (R. 442, line 9) (It would appear that 
the $25 .00 allowed by the trial court under this item 
probably was intended to have been allowed under item 9 
above, but was inadvertently assigned to this one.) 
Owner's item No. 13. Cleaning reflectors, rewiring 
light standard. The owner's own witness testified that this 
work, which was done in October, might have been 
naturally required because of the nature of the lights and 
their open reflectors. (R. 443, line 4) 
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Owner's item No. 14. Cleaning sand traps. The own-
er testified that the lessee did this work voluntarily and 
that his, the owner's, payment for it was equally volun-
tarily given. ( R. 296, line 20) 
Owner's item No. 15. Plumbing bid to complete ac-
cording to specifications. The owner's failure to specify 
the components of this claim does not assist in discussing 
it. Part of this aggregate amount appears to represent 
claims based on alleged use of smaller than specified pipe. 
It would appear that since there never has been any 
complaint as to the adequacy of the water supply or 
capability in the building, and that in fact a pressure re-
ducer was installed by the lessee, that the trial court, for 
these reasons of credibility, disallowed these aspects of 
the claim. During construction, it was determined that 
one specific length of pipe otherwise called for in the 
specifications was not needed. This item, in the amount 
of $83.10 was agreed to by the contractor and was allowed 
by the trial court. Part of the rest of this claim appears 
to be a claim for fittings allegedly eliminated and for labor 
saved by the contractor. There is nothing in the record 
to show where or what fittings, if any, were eliminated. 
The trial court was correct in ignoring an unproven alle-
gation. The same applies to the alleged claim for labor 
savings to the contractor, plus the fact that the contractor 
was not obligated to the owner to expend any specified 
sums for labor. This again was properly denied by he trial 
court. The balance of this unsegregated claim is apparent-
ly based on an assertion that the contractor was obligated 
under the contract to use a larger water meter than was 
installed by the city at the contractor's expense. At no 
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time, however, has the architect complained of the water 
meter. It is not on his check list. (Ex. 16) Chidester, the 
owner's plumbing witness, first testified that a 1 Y2" meter 
was installed though the contract called for a 2" meter 
(R. 411, line 19); however, after being given an oppor-
tunity to point out to the court where a 2" meter, or any 
meter for that matter, was specified, he explained that the 
specifications did not specify a 2" meter, and, in fact, did 
not specify meter size at all. ( R. 416, line 27; R. 417, line 
19) As a matter of fact, the expression "water meter" or 
"meter" with reference to water, does not appear any 
place in the contract, the plans or the specifications, to 
the best of counsel's ability to search for such items. Since 
the contract did not call for any given size water meter, 
and the service is admittedly more than adequate - even 
requiring a pressure reducer - it would have been error 
for the trial court to have allowed this specious claim. 
Owner's item No. 16. Difference between the cost 
of overhead and underground wiring. As let, the contract 
called for an underground electrical service to the build-
ing. The contract plans also showed the utility pole to be 
on or within a couple of feet of the property line. (R. 244, 
line 22) (Ex. 3) In fact, however, the utility pole was 
some 10 to 12 feet over into the neighbor's property. (R. 
244, line 25; R. 23) The contract required the owner to 
obtain needed easements. (Ex. 1, Art. 5) He did not, 
(Smith's deposition, page 19) although requested by the 
contractor to do so. (R. 305, line 13) With full knowledge 
and acquiescence of the architectural supervisor, the de-
cision was made to use an overhead service since the owner 
had failed to provide the easement for the underground 
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service. ( R. 246, line 15) This was approved by the archi-
tect, the owner's agent. ( R. 246, line 28) In view of the 
owner's breach of his obligation to provide the easement, 
and the approval of the overhead service by his architect, 
the trial court was correct in its denial of extra damages 
which would simply have rewarded the owner for his 
breach. 
Owner's item No. 17. Items of credit agreed to by 
the contractor and not allowed the (sic) court. In a less 
serious and dignified setting, one mighty simply ask as to 
this claim "Who is trying to fool whom?" for the simple 
reason that the record reference cited by the owner refers 
only to a letter of negotiation requesting payment long 
prior to suit, on which letter the owner took no action. In 
reality a credit of $194.00 was allowed. (Contract price, 
$38,750. $33,107 paid. Amount claimed in suit is $5,449. 
Credit difference is $194.00.) 
Owner's item No. 18. Asphalt work .This item and 
Item No. 1 deal with the east wall and the alleged dam-
aged claimed relevant thereto, therefore this following 
portion of the brief will treat all aspects of the east wall 
claims, some of which are referred to in Point 4 of the 
owner's brief. 
Initially it should be pointed out that while there is 
evidence that the east wall did leak near the foundation 
at one time, the final and uncontradicted evidence from 
the man most likely to know - the lessee - is that the 
wall does not leak. David C. Stephens, lessee, testified, 
"All I know is that it is not coming in any more. (R. 548, 
line 1) 
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However, if liability for difficulties with the east wall 
is to be attributed to one of the parties, it must, under 
the fact, be attributed to the owner whose breach of con-
tract caused the difficulty. The contract called for the 
contractor to build a building one foot distant from the 
retaining wall on the adjacent property. It was on this 
basis that bids were requested, made and the contract let. 
Had the building been built according to the contract, the 
difficulty would not have arisen. Instead, however, in the 
contractor's absence, in gross bad faith and in clear breach 
of his own contractual duties, the owner or the architect 
acting at his request ordered a substantial, cardinal, and 
material deviation from the contract terms by interfering 
with the work in progress and orally ordering the con-
struction crew to shift the building to only one half the 
contract distance between it and the retaining wall - a 
subsantial, a gross and completely intervening alteration. 
(R. 320, lines 1-23; R. 345, line 15 and following; R. 306, 
line 19; R. 358, line 12) This change was ordered orally, 
in the contractor's absence even while the forms were 
being constructed for the foundation after the footings had 
been put in, without any prior notice to the contractor 
even though it appears that both the owner and he archi-
tect knew, even at the time of letting the contract, that 
they would eventually do this. (R. 345, line 25; Smith's 
Deposition, p. 22) Such a substantial change, one not 
complying with the terms of the contract, constitutes a 
substantial breach of the contract by the owner for the 
consequences of which he must be responsible. 
There is competent evidence in the record that this 
unauthorized change made double forming impossible, 
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requiring only single forming, which was acquiesced in and 
approved by the architectural supervisor. (R. 280; R. 281, 
line 20) 
Even assuming that the contractor should bear the 
cost needed to insure waterproofing of the wall as a matter 
of precaution, the trial court was generous in allowing 
$150.00 for this because the uncontradicted, competent 
evidence of experts is that it can properly be done for less. 
Jack Duncan, a waterproofing expert with over 15 years 
experience in this type of work testified that it could be 
done for $85.00. ( R. 528, lines 3, 9; R. 529, lines 15-30) 
He had done this type work successfully previously. ( R. 
530, line 27) There would be no danger of erosion of the 
mortar. (R. 533, lines 18, 30) It would actually withstand 
several feet of hydrostatic pressure on the other side. (R. 
538, line 14) 
Lynn C. Layton, of Layton Roofing Company, with 
over 30 years experience including waterproofing of walls, 
testified that the waterproofing would cost no more than 
$100.00. ( R. 554, through 556) 
Eugene Bowers, general manager of Bowers Con-
struction Company, a graduate of Annapolis Naval Aca-
demy with studies of water and the effect of hydrostatic 
pressure (R. 568, lines 6-30; R. 569, line 5) and who had 
had experience with similar leakage problems similarly 
testified that the methods described by Mr. Duncan would 
work very successfully. He had utilized similar experts and 
methods to cure leakage problems even under an actual 
hydrostatic head. ( R. 569, lines 8-16) 
There is thus ample, substantial, competent evidence 
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to support the judgment. To require tearing the wall 
down and rebuilding it when the cause of the trouble lies 
with the owner and can be corrected for a nominal sum 
would be ludicrous travesty on justice. Bingham v. Stev-
enson, 420 P. 2d 839 (Mont. 1966); Williams v. Nall, 4 
Ariz. App. 416, 420 P. 2d 988 ( 1966). 
There is equally no merit to the owner's assertions 
that it is entitled to alleged loss of rent because of un-
justified delay in completing the building. The evidence 
is all to the contrary. 
While the lease between the owner and the lessee 
provided that the owner would have the building "ready 
for fixtures on or before April 1, 1962," (Ex. 6, p. 2) the 
contract between the owner and the contractor which is 
dated January 4 provided that the building would be 
completed "ninety calendar (90) days after receipt of 
notic eto commence work." (Ex. 1 ) There is no evidence 
in the record of the date of any notice, if any was given, 
to commence work given to the contractor despite the 
specific requirement of the giving of notice. 
The reference by the owner in his brief to the com-
ment in the bidding instructions that work would com-
mence five days after letting the contract is grossly mis-
leading. The specifications, not he bidding insructions, are 
part of the contract. It is elementary that the bidding in-
structions and information are superseded by the actual 
contract, which in this case specifically and clearly called 
for the giving of notice to commence in order to start the 
clock running. 
Even at that, the date for completion of the building 
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on the part of the contractor would not have met the date 
the owner had promised the lessees. 
The evidence showed that there was a delay in get-
ting a building permit. ( R. 26 7, line 1 ; R. 268, line 12) 
Within a few days very inclement weather set in, so bad 
that the ground froze solid. (R. 270, line 26; R. 514, line 
3; R. 525, line 19; Ex. 33, 34 and 35. See particularly Ex. 
33, p. 3 and Ex. 34, page 26, which have "Daily Soil Tem-
peratures" charts showing that the ground was frozen from 
about the first of January, reaching a depth of 20 inches 
by January 12 and remaining frozen to this depth until the 
12th of February.) 
The evidence shows that during this time, by a letter 
dated January 10, 1962, and received by McDermott on 
or before January 12, 1962 (Request for admissions in 
file, R. 104), the contractor requested an extension of time 
because of the weather and the zoning problems. There 
is competent evidence that the extension was granted. ( R. 
521, lines 17, 23; R. 524, line 24). There is no contradic-
tory evidence. By about mid-February the ground had 
thawed sufficiently to permit commencement of construc-
tion. ( R. 268, line 21 ) 
By about April 20, the lessees commenced installing 
their fixtures. ( R. 262, line 14; R. 544, line 4) 
Before discussing the effect of the terms of the lease 
between the owner and the lessees, it must be noted that 
there is no evidence from anyone that the contractor was 
informed of he specific monetary, and particularly the 
specific "penalty" provisions of the lease until litigation 
developed. 
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However, under the terms of the lease - unknown to 
the contractor-the lessees were to pay the owner $100.00 
per month (apparently commencing December 1, 1961) 
until the "proposed building is finished and ready for oc-
cupancy." The building shall be considered as ready for 
occupancy on the first of the calendar month after the 
month in which the building is completed in accordance 
with the paragraph CONSTRUCTION and after poses-
sion thereof has been tendered to LESSEE." (emphasis 
added) (Ex. 6) The CONSTRUCTION paragraph of 
the lease provides that "The construction shall be com-
pleted by SMITH ready for fixtures on or before April 1, 
1962." It then further provides, as between the owner and 
the lessees, that if the building is not completed on the 
specified date (April 1), then the owner shall pay a pen-
alty to the lessees of $20.00 per day until the advance ren-
tals are thereby absorbed. The regular rent on the laundry 
and dry cleaning portion of the building was to be $525.00 
per month. 
There is evidence that the lessees made the following 
payments: 
December 1, 1961 
January 2, 1962 
February 1, 1962 
February 28, 1962 
April 2, 1962 
$100.00 
$100.00 
$100.00 
$100.00 
$100.00 
(This even though the 
lease provisions speci-
fied that the building 
should be ready by 
April 1) 
June 1, 1962 
July 2, 1962 
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$ 25.00 
$525.00 
The following then appears to be the time schedule 
of events: 
December 1, 1961 
January 2, 1962 
January 4, 1962 
January 10, 1962 
January 19, 1962 
February 1, 1962 
February 11, 1962 
February 28, 1962 
April 2, 1962 
April 20, 1962 
May 12, 1962 
May 29 or 
June 1, 1962 
June 1, 1962 
July 1, 1962 
$100.00 advance rent paid. 
$100.00 advance rent paid. 
Contract let. 
Contractor's request for ex-
tension of time because of 
weather and zoning. 
Building permit granted. 
$100.00 advance rent paid. 
Thaw permitted start of con-
struction. 
$100.00 advance rent paid. 
$100.00 advance rent paid. 
Lessees commenced installing 
fixtures. 
90 days from February 11. 
Lesse~s opened to public. 
$ 25 .00 rent paid by lessees. 
$525.00 rent paid by lessees. 
The lease frankly denominated the $20.00 per day 
as a "penalty" which, as such, would not have been en-
forcable by the lessees against the owner. It was not liqui-
dated damages, nor were these terms even known to the 
contractor. 
There is ample, substantial evidence to support the 
trial court's denial of loss of rent on this portion of the 
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building on any of several theories. These include but 
need not be limited to the setting in of weather so incle-
ment as to preclude construction until in February; or the 
fact that no notice to commence was ever given; or the 
extension granted by the architect; or that it was within 
the owner's power - with reference to the lessees - to 
determine when he would deem the building completed 
for the purposes of rent payment; or that the terms of the 
lease were not disclosed to the contractor and therefore 
he is not liable for special damages, even if enforceable 
between the parties. 
In any event, since the lessees commenced installing 
their fixtures on or about April 20, 1962, the owner was 
entitled to start collecting rent on May 1, with no loss 
to himself. 
Under these circumstances it cannot be said that 
there is not substantial, competent evidence to support the 
trial court's denial of damages for loss of rent on the 
laundry and dry cleaning portion of the building. 
Equally, there is no basis for assessing loss of rent as 
to the small north room of the building. This portion was 
only to be "roughed-in" by the contractor. All that might 
have prevented the owner from leasing this room -
assuming a renter - was the tile on the floor and paint, 
according to the owner's testimony. (R. 401, lines 16-22) 
According to the owner, the contractor did this remaining 
contract work in the last of August or the first of Septem-
ber. (R. 399, line 25) Even then it was not rented until 
in November. (R. 398, line 4) 
As the judge stated during the trial, the owner could 
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not sit back and charge the contractor for rent when a 
small expenditure for tile and paint would have put the 
room in a rentable condition. (R. 398, line 28; R. 401, 
line 25; R. 402, line 2) Even at that, there is no evidence 
that the owner actually could have rented it on any spe-
cific terms. 
POINT III. THERE IS NO MERIT TO THE CON-
TENTION THAT THE CONTRACTOR WAS 
REQUIRED TO PLEAD AND PROVE CERTI-
FICATION BY THE ARCHITECT AS A CON-
DITION OF RECOVERY BY SUIT. 
A careful reading of the terms of the contract does 
not indicate that the decisions of the architect are either 
the only means whereby the contractor can obtain pay 
nor are they final and conclusive on anybody. Under 
Article 18 of the General Conditions the decisions of the 
architect are not only not final and conclusive on any-
body, but they are specifically even subject to arbitration. 
(Ex. 1) 
The authorities cited by the appellant actually sup-
port the position that "(T) he court should not imply an 
agreement to submit to an architect or engineer matters 
arising under a building or construction contract, but 
should require clear and express language, because it is 
contracting away the right of the parties to appeal to the 
courts of justice in case of controversy," Anno.J 54 A.L.R: 
1255, 1256; Central Trust Co. v. LouisvilleJ St. L. & T. R. 
Co.J 70 Fed. 282, 285 ( 1895). As expressed in Jefferson 
Hotel Co. v. BrumbauchJ 168 Fed. 867 (1909), "Where 
the stipulation does not provide that the decision of the 
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engineer shall be final and conclusive, it is merely prima 
facie evidence of the matters decided." 
But to make such a certificate or decision conclusive 
requires plain language in the contract. It is not to be 
implied. Anno. 54 A.L.R. 1255; Ryan v. Curlew Irrig. & 
Reservoir Co., 36 Utah 382, 104 Pac. 218 (1912). 
Since there is no language in the contract purporting 
to make the decision of the architect a condition precedent 
to payment or recovery by suit, or final and conclusive, 
these arguments of the appellant, not pleaded or raised 
below, are nonpersuasive. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, the respondents re-
spectfully pray this Court to issue its order: 
1. Directing the trial court to grant a mechanic's 
lien, foreclosure thereof, and reasonable attorney's fees to 
the respondent-contractor. 
2. And otherwise to affirm the judgment of the 
trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NESLEN AND 1-iOCK 
1000 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
By ROBERT L. SCHMID 
Attorneys for the Respondents 
and Cross Appellants 
